How should we pay for health care reform? That simple question has long defied any easy answers. To be sure, paying for health reform is an economic and normative issue, and solutions that variously satisfy efficiency and equity considerations can be identified, at least in theory. But health care financing is ultimately a political issue: no funding scheme will be adopted on the basis of economic merit alone. Anyone doubting that proposition need only look at the current U.S. health care system for ample evidence that sound economics often does not serve as the foundation for public policy.
introducing new ones in an economic sector that accounts for over $2 trillion.
3 Those questions in turn invite political debates about the size of government, the economic consequences of taxation, and the desirability of progressive funding. Comprehensive health reform, in other words, entails financing reform and financing reform triggers debates over both money and ideology. And therein lies a major reason why comprehensive health reform perennially fails in the U.S.: reformers have yet to fashion a politically acceptable solution for funding universal coverage that can win those debates. Indeed, the last effort at comprehensive reform, the Clinton administration's illfated Health Security Act, imploded in large part because the administration could not secure a Congressional majority for its financing strategy.
This paper explores the politics of paying for health reform. 4 I begin by briefly sketching out the political and institutional contexts that shape reformers' efforts to finance universal coverage. Next, I set out the menu of available funding options and analyze their political feasibility. Finally, I examine the political consequences of different funding arrangements and the potential implications for cost control.
The Political and Institutional Contexts for Financing Reform
Health reformers looking for new revenues to pay for universal coverage face a challenging political environment that is loaded with constraints and short on easy money. First, it is worth highlighting the status quo in U.S. health financing if only because that status quo has proven so resistant to change. The U.S. currently finances medical care through a mix of public and private sources, and via a wide array of funding instruments including employer and employee-paid health insurance premiums, earmarked payroll taxes, federal and state general revenues, sin taxes, and out of pocket payments. That mix may not be ideal but it is politically entrenched; various constituencies are accustomed to and benefit from (or believe they benefit from) current arrangements, making dramatic shifts in health care financing difficult.
Second, universal coverage requires raising new revenues from existing sources or introducing new taxes, yet the political environment of tax policy suggests that neither requirement is easily attainable. Tax revenues comprise 25.5% of GDP in the U.S., 3 Tax revenues' share of the U.S. GDP today is virtually identically to their share (25.6%) in 1975. Simply put, the U.S. raises fewer revenues than other industrialized democracies, which complicates efforts to adopt and pay for public programs, including universal health insurance. 6 Recent tax policy does not offer much encouragement for those seeking to buck the trend. Since the 1970s, anti-tax sentiment has played an influential role in American politics. Walter Mondale's lopsided defeat in the 1984 presidential election (he had campaigned on a platform of raising taxes) and the controversy over George H.W. Bush's breaking his 1988 "read my lips" pledge not to raise taxes cast a shadow over contemporary tax politics. 7 The political equation of tax policy is by now familiar:
Republicans often intensely oppose tax increases and Democrats are often intensely fearful of sponsoring tax increases. That equation resonated strongly in recent years, as George W. Bush sponsored a series of major tax cuts that decreased federal revenues by $2 trillion over a decade, with the benefits skewed towards high-income Americans.
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The Bush tax cuts have important implications for any future effort at health reform. Not only will reformers have fewer revenues to draw on to pay for universal coverage, they will have to grapple with the political consequences of the scheduled expiration of the Bush tax cuts in 2011. A high-stakes debate over the future of U.S. fiscal policy is likely, since making the tax cuts permanent would increase the federal budget deficit (which now stands at $248 billion) by $3.2 trillion from 2008-2017. 9 While there will be fiscal pressures to let the tax cuts expire lest they exacerbate the deficit, there surely will be political pressure to maintain some of the cuts lest members of Congress suffer at the ballot box. Health reformers will also have to compete for revenues in coming years with everything from AMT reform to spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the long-term budget outlook is for growing federal deficits that could constrain efforts to pay for universal coverage. If fiscal discipline reappears in Washington, deficit reduction will make a sizable claim on any new tax revenues.
None of this is to say that increasing taxes to fund universal coverage is impossible. The current political environment for tax policy is not permanent: Presidents and Congresses change, and so too does fiscal policy. President George H.W. Bush and a
Democratic Congress agreed to a significant tax increase in 1990 and President Clinton won enactment for a series of tax increases in 1993 (both increases were part of deficit reduction legislation). 10 Moreover, reformers can argue that growing federal deficits require health care reform, since those deficits are driven in no small part by rising
Medicare and Medicaid outlays. And the Bush tax cuts provide reformers with an extraordinary opportunity inasmuch as universal coverage can be paid for by canceling (or letting expire) select cuts for higher-income taxpayers. Yet it is also evident that tax increases have not come easily in recent decades: the 1993 Clinton budget plan won enactment only after Vice President Al Gore broke a tie in the Senate (it passed the House 218-216), and George H.W. Bush faced a backlash in the Republican party after abandoning his 1990 no taxes pledge. Moreover, Americans' trust in government has declined sharply over the past three decades, which could make it harder to gain public acceptance for raising taxes to pay for a new federal program. 11 If universal coverage is to be secured, health reformers will have to overcome the legacies of anti-tax politics as well as flagging faith in government.
A third constraint is the reemergence of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules in
Congress. PAYGO, first adopted as part of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, required that new mandatory spending and revenue laws had to be budget neutral. 12 The costs of any new entitlement programs and tax cuts had to be offset through higher taxes or spending cuts. In the Senate, PAYGO rules could be waived only with 60 votes.
PAYGO rules were in place during 1990-2002, were not renewed during 2003-2006, and were reinstated in 2007.
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The return of PAYGO makes it harder to finance universal coverage. 14 As the Clinton administration learned, PAYGO means that proposals to expand coverage must be paid for with real revenues and real savings. During the 1990s, PAYGO gave the Congressional Budget Office a prominent role in health policymaking as CBO scored 11 In a July 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll, only 24% of respondents trusted government "just about always" (2%) or "most of the time" (22%).
12 Peter S. Orszag, "Issues in Reinstating a Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Requirement," Statement Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2007.
13 Richard Kogan, "The New Pay-As-You-Go Rule in the House of Representatives," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 12, 2007. 14 PAYGO rules could also make it harder to extend the Bush tax cuts, since the cost of extending them would have to be offset. many institutional hurdles, the chances of taking an ideal financing plan developed by policy analysts and adopting it exactly as envisioned into law are indeed slim.
The Financing Menu
I now turn to a political analysis of the main options for funding comprehensive reform. Several caveats are in order. First, these options are not necessarily mutually exclusive, real-life health reform plans can and do combine various funding alternatives listed separately in this menu. In part that is because a distinction exists between where to get new money to subsidize the uninsured and how to finance coverage and ensure universality in a reformed system. Second, my focus is on the politics of funding universal coverage at the national level. States have a somewhat different set of choices, including the option of financing reform by drawing on federal revenues. Third, I am primarily concerned here with feasibility not desirability. It is common for health reformers of all stripes to believe that their preferred solution is also the most politically viable, but that doesn't make it so. Some funding schemes have compelling substantive virtues but glaring political vices, and vice versa. Finally, while this section makes preliminary judgments about the political feasibility of select financing options, ultimately feasibility is determined by much more than those options' internal political properties, a theme I return to in the paper's conclusion.
The Holy Grail
The first place many health reformers look for funds to cover the uninsured is the tax code. In particular, the tax exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance 
The Zombie
There is a familiar litany of problems with employer-sponsored insurance: it is inequitable, with coverage varying by firm size, industry, and wages; it promotes "job lock" and when workers lose their jobs they lose insurance coverage; it does not effectively accommodate part-time, self-employed and other "new economy" workers; it places companies in the burdensome and intrusive position of making health care choices for their employees; as noted above, it is subsidized through a regressive tax subsidy that disproportionately benefits higher-income workers; it imposes regressive flat premiums that require low-income workers to pay a higher share of their incomes for health insurance than their better-off coworkers; it is administratively expensive; it obscures the costs of insurance and has never produced sustainable cost control. 25 Clearly, the employer mandate enjoys enduring appeal: like a zombie, it is a policy option that simply will not die.
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There are substantive advantages to employer-sponsored insurance, including risk pooling. But the explanation for employer mandates' persistent centrality in health reform debates has much more to do with perceived political advantages. First, as Larry Brown explains, an employer mandate "can wear the halo of incrementalism." In economic terms there may be no difference between an employer-mandated premium contribution and a tax, especially given the axiom that employers' health care expenses are largely shifted to workers in the form of lower wages. But in political terms the gap can be huge since many workers undoubtedly believe that employers are paying for their health insurance when they pay the lion's share of premium costs. Since employers now pay on average 84% of premiums for single coverage and 73% for family coverage, introducing a mandate that requires employer contribution rates in that range maintains the status quo for insured Americans. 30 The perception that employersponsored insurance is paid for by employers is thus a large part of employer mandates' political appeal. That this perception, according to conventional economic wisdom, is wrong matters not for the politics of reform: economic facts are, in this instance, no match for political realities.
Third, an employer mandate could command broad public support. It embodies the idea that employers should help pay for their workers' health insurance, a practice that Americans are accustomed to. An employer mandate also taps into cultural notions that workers are deserving beneficiaries of social protections, so that extending insurance coverage can be portrayed as an issue of fairness. The concept that work should pay has conservative as well as liberal appeal. In a 2003 poll, 77% of respondents (including 72% of Republicans) favored requiring businesses to offer private insurance as a means to cover the uninsured. 31 Well-insured Americans who now receive health insurance through their jobs might look favorably at reforms that reinforce rather than replace the employer-sponsored system. Companies that already pay for their own employees' health insurance and must not only compete with firms that do not insure but also pay for those firms' uninsured workers (through cost-shifting and dependent coverage) might also support a mandate, especially if there is a cap on the maximum employer contribution. by the CBO among others, 33 but to those who it will be imposed on the compulsory mandate to pay for health insurance represents a clear and substantial expansion of government authority. Such an expansion will necessarily be controversial.
An employer mandate is also vulnerable to arguments that it will impair economic competitiveness and, through its impact on small businesses, hurt the economy (again, the reality could be different but political perception is what counts here). And while employers who presently provide insurance may prefer an employer mandate over other forms of universal health insurance, when push comes to shove they may prefer even more to keep the employer-sponsored insurance system voluntary and to maintain the time-tested option of cutting back on coverage and shifting costs to workers. Finally, the 32 Brown, "Who Shall Pay?," 178. 33 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Administration's Health Proposal (U.S. GPO, 1994) . CBO concluded that employer and employee premium payments to Health Alliances under the Clinton health plan should be considered as "government receipts" and included as part of the federal budget.
status quo that an employer mandate builds on is shaky and moving in the wrong direction. In 2007, only 60% of all firms offered health benefits, down from 69% in 2000. 34 As health care costs march upwards and the percentage of firms that provide insurance drops even further, the political distance that a mandate must cross to achieve universal coverage by compelling all firms to pay for health insurance grows.
The Social Insurance Special
Rather than relying on an employer mandate and the politically convenient (if economically dubious) proposition that it is not a tax, a universal coverage system could be funded directly through payroll taxes. After all, payroll taxes already occupy a prominent position in U.S. fiscal policy, comprising 35% of all federal revenues (second only to income taxes as a revenue source for the national government). 35 Two of the most popular social programs in the U.S., Medicare and Social Security, rely on payroll taxes. 36 The programs' popularity is arguably due in part to their financing arrangements.
Payroll taxes mean that benefits are earned by workers, who as contributors finance current program obligations while establishing their own entitlement to future benefits, Republicans are ideologically opposed to raising such taxes, and Democrats, scarred by the stigma of being labeled a tax and spend party, are reluctant to sponsor payroll tax increases. 42 There is arguably more public support for raising payroll taxes than policymakers believe but as long as the aforementioned political dynamics hold it will be difficult to fund universal coverage by enacting a substantial new payroll tax.
Payroll tax financing would also create visible losers, among them companies that do not currently provide health insurance, and employees whose premiums are now entirely covered by their employers. 43 If the payroll tax is, like Social Security and Medicare, funded jointly through equal employer and employee payments, it will represent a tax increase for many employees, and it could substantially raise costs for well-insured, middle-and high-income earners. 44 On the other hand, if the payroll tax rate is set so that employers are paying a greater share than employees (say an 80%/20% split) 45 it will only intensify employer opposition. In other words, there is no politically painless way to create a new payroll tax. And unless the payroll tax rate is set at very high rates, additional revenues will probably be needed to pay for universal coverage and those who are outside of the workforce. Finally, payroll taxes are politically vulnerable to charges that they would raise labor costs, reduce employment, and hurt the economy.
Reformers could respond that employers and employees are already paying exorbitant health insurance premiums, and that a payroll tax-financed, single-payer system would spend less money on health care than we do now by creating monopsony purchasing power and reducing administrative costs. There is much substantive merit to that argument. However, it does not diminish the political costs of switching from employer-paid premiums to a payroll tax system that would transfer private health care spending to the public budget. Even if spending on health care is less than it would be otherwise, more of that spending would be funded from taxes. A payroll tax ultimately cannot avoid the political liabilities that inevitably come with explicitly raising taxes.
The Combo
Play or pay financing for health reform, a modified employer mandate whereby employers provide for coverage or pay a quit tax (usually as a percentage of payroll) to Yet the political virtue of choice that lies at the core of play or pay also can be a political vice. By establishing a system that calls for creating an employer mandate and a payroll tax, play or pay financing potentially takes on the political liabilities of both financing options: opponents can argue that play or pay simultaneously means a big new tax and a big new mandate on employers. Either argument can be politically lethal on its own, overcoming both of them could prove extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, because workers whose companies pay the quit tax as well as other uninsured persons are enrolled in or given access to government insurance programs, play or pay plans are also subject to the charge that they open a backdoor path to national health insurance by expanding the scope of public programs. Indeed, if the tax option is set low enough so that it's a financially more attractive option for many employers to pay the tax rather than provide insurance themselves, a substantial shift in enrollment towards public insurance could in fact occur (a shift that could be hastened by rising health care costs). Advocates of public insurance will find this outcome to their liking and view this feature as a crucial virtue of play or pay; opponents will just as certainly see it as a critical vice. Finally, the more that play or pay schemes hold down the payroll tax level and increase subsidies to win business support (especially among small businesses), the more they require additional funds from sources other than the quit tax to pay for universal coverage.
The Foreigner
One alternative to financing universal health insurance through employers-either through mandates or payroll taxes-is to turn to a value-added tax (VAT consumption taxes are widely used in other industrialized countries, with the U.S.
presently the only OECD nation without a VAT.
Funding the health care system exclusively through an earmarked VAT could promote cost control since any increase in health care funding that exceeded general economic growth would require explicitly raising the VAT level. In other words, Americans' traditional resistance to tax increases would help rein in health care spending and a VAT would provide a clear and transparent instrument that reflected the public's willingness to pay more for medical care. 48 And since a VAT-funded health care system would replace employer financing, it could attract support from businesses who, buffeted by rising costs, want to get out of the business of providing and paying for their workers'
(and for some companies, their retirees') health insurance.
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Yet a VAT faces formidable political barriers. As advocates of the metric system can attest to, widespread use abroad does not necessarily make a foreign innovationeven a sensible one-any easier to import here. 50 The same anti-tax strain that might keep a VAT from rising too fast also might keep it from being enacted in the first place.
Introducing a major new tax to the United States would, to say the least, not be easy: will members of Congress who are reluctant to raise existing taxes step up to sponsor a significant new tax that is unfamiliar to the public and whose benefits and economic logic Finally, though a VAT is broad-based, it may not be broad enough to serve as the sole financing source for health care. A VAT would raise net revenues equivalent to .4% of GDP for each percentage point of the tax; in 2005, a VAT of 5% would have raised an estimated $250 billion in revenues. 54 Given that U.S. health care costs now consume 16% of GDP and over $2 trillion, it quickly becomes apparent that it would take a very high VAT, so high as to be politically untenable, to finance all U.S. medical care spending. Excluding, at least in the short-run, the Medicare and Medicaid populations would lower the tab but such a financing system would still require a double-digit VAT, 55 a reality few politicians will be eager to embrace.
As the retirement of the baby boomers and escalating health care costs put more pressure on the federal budget, the VAT could re-emerge as an option for generating needed revenues. But in health reform, any VAT plan that seeks to displace employerbased financing invites political sticker-shock at the visible revenues that must be raised to replace the largely invisible financing system that now exists. That sticker-shock could be moderated by lowering the tax rate and instead using a VAT to pay for a modest part of the nation's health care bill, rather than establishing it as the sole or primary financing source of a universal system. But even an incremental VAT is likely to ignite considerable political controversy. Finally, health care reform could be funded through a so-called "fat tax" (think "Big Macs for the Uninsured"). That would mobilize public health advocates looking to alter eating habits and capitalize on growing public policy concern over the consequences of rising obesity rates. 59 It also could, given the rate at which Americans consume unhealthy foods, potentially raise substantial funds; targets could include everything from snack foods and soft drinks to foods high in saturated fat, salt, and sugar. 60 However, since a broad-based obesity tax would impact many Americans, as well as the companies whose profits depend on selling fat, it could face significant opposition. Public opinion data currently show substantially less support for taxing snack foods than for other public health interventions, such as taxing cigarettes. 61 Moreover, estimated revenues from taxing obesity are not as large as one might think; politically palatable small taxes on snack foods and other items generate only modest revenues. 62 In order for an obesity tax to pay for a significant share of the universal coverage bill, much higher food taxes would be required, and such taxes would in turn generate much stronger opposition. 63 In sum, the sin taxes most likely to be used successfully in health reform are precisely those least likely to generate substantial revenues. Sin taxes can play a role as part of a broader financing package for universal coverage, but that role is likely to be limited.
The All-American
Universal coverage could also be funded without any new revenues at all. That is, it could simply be added to the federal budget and to the federal deficit, with the costs of a universal system paid for through general revenues. Before dismissing that proposition as fiscally irresponsible, it is worth noting that we have financed a number of recent public policies through deficit financing, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Medicare prescription drug benefit, and tax cuts. Apparently, these activities were deemed sufficiently socially (or politically) desirable that they required no dedicated funding or offsetting savings and simply could be added to the federal ledger. It tells you all you need to know about the uninsured that this option evidently is not viable for health reform. We ultimately find ways to fund policies and activities that are national priorities.
Since the uninsured are evidently not a priority, affordability concerns block their claim on the federal budget while those same concerns are suspended for more valued programs and populations. The notion that universal coverage is unaffordable remains, as Uwe
Reinhardt argues, a political fiction, since even when the United States had a projected surplus of $5.6 trillion in 2001 policymakers were not moved to use those funds to finance expanded coverage and instead approved a major tax cut that disproportionately benefited wealthier Americans.
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Of course, there are ways to responsibly pay for health reform through general revenues (which finance such All-American programs as education and defense) without adding to the deficit. One is simply to raise more general revenues. 65 And here we find liberals' health reform holy grail: paying for universal coverage by rolling back the Bush tax cuts. That option, popular among 2008 Democratic presidential candidates, makes health reform explicitly redistributive. Health insurance coverage is funded for mostly low-income Americans by raising taxes on higher-income Americans so that the health care and tax systems are both made fairer in one fell swoop.
There are three political advantages to this financing strategy. First, there is ample money to be had from the Bush tax cuts-for instance, Hillary Clinton's health plan estimates that about $50 billion could be raised just from eliminating tax cuts for households making over $250,000. 66 Consequently, a large share of the universal coverage bill can be paid for without imposing any new broad-based taxes or raising existing taxes on most Americans.
Second, there is reason to believe a majority of the public would support using revenues from rolling back the Bush tax cuts to fund universal coverage. In a February 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll, 76% of those surveyed said that making sure all cuts, and 61% were willing to pay higher taxes "so that all Americans have health insurance they can't lose no matter what." 67 To be sure, financial sacrifices are easy to make in the abstract; saying "yes" to a pollster doesn't come with any cost. But even if insured Americans cringe at the reality of paying higher taxes to cover the uninsured, they might not oppose their wealthier compatriots having to do so, especially given public opinion data showing that a majority of respondents believe rich people pay less in taxes than they should. 68 Moreover, there is precedent (e.g., the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) for adopting tax changes that increase federal revenues by "zap [ping] the rich" 69 and focusing tax hikes on higher-income Americans. However, this financing strategy carries the same political vulnerabilities as previously discussed options that are explicitly redistributive and visibly raise taxes. It invites charges of "class warfare" and allegations that if Washington is allowed to raise taxes on your rich neighbor, you're next. Anti-tax groups will argue that any tax increase harms the economy and there is no assurance that advocates will be able to convince the public that only tax cuts for the wealthy are being rolled back. Indeed, depending on how middle class and wealthy is defined, such a tax hike could affect more Americans than the tax the rich rhetoric suggests. Moreover, the 2001 Bush tax cuts received broad public support even though they were regressive and large public majorities favored repeal of the estate tax.
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Paying for health reform by raising taxes on upper-income taxpayers also imposes the financial burden of covering the uninsured on a group that already has insurance and believes it has little to gain from universal coverage. Finally, it does the one thing that health reformers have tried so hard since the 1980s to avoid:
explicitly raise taxes.
Another option for financing health reform through general revenues is the Medicaid model, with the federal government providing matching funds to states. This approach has the fiscal advantage of minimizing federal costs since a significant portion of the universal coverage bill would be shifted away from Washington, and the political advantage of capitalizing on enthusiasm for federalism and states' growing role in health reform. 71 However, fiscal federalism would simply shift the financing dilemma to the state level without providing any solutions, and the federal government would still have to pay the lion's share of costs, again raising the issue of where those additional revenues are going to come from.
A third way to fund universal coverage through general revenues without worsening the deficit is to find offsetting savings in current programs, namely Medicare and Medicaid. This was in fact a major component of the Clinton administration's financing plan for the Health Security Act. With big, expensive health insurance 70 Bartels, "Homer Gets a Tax Cut." In large part, that is because public opinion on tax policy is "ill informed, insensitive to some of the most important implications of the tax cuts, and oddly disconnected from (or misconnected to) a variety of relevant values and material interests" (21). On public support for the estate tax, see Larry Bartels, "Unenlightened Self-Interest: The Strange Appeal of the Estate-Tax Repeal," American Prospect May 17, 2004. 71 White, "Budgeting and Health Policymaking," 70.
programs comes the opportunity for big savings, from lower payments to medical providers and health plans, higher premium payments from beneficiaries (in Medicare), and reductions in utilization of high-priced services. The federal government has previously shown the capacity (in 1983, 1989, and 1997) in existing programs, so redirecting spending has its own political costs. 73 In addition, it is not clear that there is enough revenue available from incrementally trimming Medicare and Medicaid to fund universal coverage either in the short or long-run, so although savings from those programs could potentially play a role in funding health reform, they can't do it alone.
The Do-It-Yourselfer
A final financing option is to stipulate that Americans must purchase their own insurance through an individual mandate. Both Massachusetts' health reform plan and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's proposed reforms rely on an individual mandate, which also is a component of John Edwards' and Hillary Clinton's health plans.
The political attraction is that health care, often described in the language of rights and government obligations, is made into a personal responsibility, enabling reformers to potentially appeal to conservative as well as liberal audiences. It forces free riders to "pay their fair share" 74 and individuals to take responsibility for their health, thereby invoking the rhetoric of responsibility popularized in recent years by the advance of health care consumerism. It also builds on the precedent of other individual mandates such as auto insurance while ensuring that everyone joins the risk pool, potentially reducing adverse selection concerns and thus the need for underwriting in insurance markets. there is likely to be a group that makes too much money to qualify for government help but whose incomes are modest enough that purchasing health insurance is a financial burden. Currently well-insured members of this group might ask why they should finance subsidies for the uninsured while actually getting less security themselves out of 76 Nichols estimates that about $100 billion could be raised from the higher income tax revenues that would follow plans to "cash out" employer-paid health insurance premiums and convert them into wages. Len M. Nichols, A Sustainable Health System for All Americans (Washington: New America Foundation, 2007 individual mandate has long attracted some bipartisan support, it is also the case that many liberals and conservatives would oppose it as, respectively, too little and too much.
In the end, an individual mandate does not offer a means for financing universal coverage as much as it imposes a requirement that then requires its own financing. The rhetoric of responsibility is no substitute for real money. The significant subsidies required by any truly comprehensive individual mandate plan mean that it must look to other sources (general revenues, sin taxes, and so on) to fund a universal system.
A Final Note on Financing Options and Cost Control
The preceding discussion focused on the political feasibility of different financing arrangements and the obstacles and opportunities each option for funding universal coverage faces. Yet funding options may also have important political consequences for a health care system. In particular, how much is a nation's capacity to control costs affected by whether its health care system is funded by dedicated revenues (such as earmarked VAT or payroll taxes) rather than general revenues?
There is a compelling theoretical case that earmarked financing should produce more robust cost control. A program funded solely through earmarked financing has, in effect, a budget that is equal to collected revenues; increases in health care spending thus 77 Brown, "Who Shall Pay?, " 177. require increases in the earmarked tax or offsetting savings from cost control.
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Explicitly increasing a separate tax is a highly visible and potentially unpopular activity.
The public and politicians alike could recoil at the prospect of endless increases in a health care tax, which could strengthen political resolve to pursue cost containment measures as an alternative. In this situation, elected officials may well decide that it is less risky to go after providers and other health care stakeholders than to go after voters with higher taxes. Public aversion to paying taxes, in other words, becomes an instrument of cost control. In contrast, paying for rising health care costs out of general revenues requires no explicit change in a dedicated tax and instead relies on politicians'
willingness to take funds from the government treasury. In this case, taking a greater share of general revenues to pay for rising health care spending might seem like an easier (and less visible) option than imposing controversial cost control measures. Looking outside the United States, the evidence of the impact of differential financing arrangements on cost control is mixed. As Figure 2 to raise taxes, as opposed to automatic increases in general revenues). 84 Yet the correlation between financing arrangements and structure of health systems (tax-financed systems also are more centralized than multi-payer social insurance systems, which abets cost control) and the limits in available data make any definitive conclusions impossible.
Finally, it is worth noting that some political scientists argue that tax revolts and welfare state backlashes are more likely in countries with high (and highly visible) income and property taxes, and less likely in countries that alternatively rely more on consumption and social insurance taxes. 85 Health system financing thus could impact overall public support for taxation and government activity, which could in turn affect the ability of public health insurance programs to raise revenues.
In sum, the theoretical expectation that earmarked financing will produce decisively superior cost control than general revenues confronts a much more complicated reality. Ultimately, the absence of a clear and consistent relationship between financing structure and cost control makes sense: after all, cost control has much to do with how providers are paid, how coordinated the payment system is, how the diffusion of medical technology is limited, how competition and markets are structured, and a host of other factors that have nothing to do with the structure of health system financing. 86 By itself, a financing arrangement cannot assure cost control. If health care support for health care, that other financing sources will be added. Indeed, funding diversification is common, as Tim Jost notes: "Both tax-financed and social insurance programs…are looking for alternative approaches to funding their health care
programs."
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There may still be grounds for preferring earmarked funding in the United States, since it would make health care spending and tax tradeoffs more visible in a country that previously has shown little spending restraint and perhaps would also lessen the temptation for deficit financing. But if the U.S. does not adopt the cost control instruments common in the OECD, it will not control costs regardless of its financing arrangements.
Conclusion
Is there a politically plausible financing strategy for comprehensive health reform? As this paper has shown, there are no obvious answers to that question. It is easy in hindsight to bash the Clinton administration for the 1993-94 health care reform debacle, but in fact there were no easy choices then about financing universal coverage and there aren't any easy choices today. All the major financing options have serious political liabilities of one kind or another; either they risk arousing public opposition and anti-tax sentiment or they risk arousing stakeholder opposition, or both. And the less controversial options generally don't raise enough money to cover all the uninsured.
Yet it would be a mistake to evaluate the feasibility of different health reform weaknesses. The reality is that political feasibility is a relative concept that changes over time, and is profoundly impacted by elections, the economy, the public mood, and other crucial socioeconomic and political factors. What is happening within the health care system-the rate of growth in insurance premiums and the uninsured population, Medicare and Medicaid costs pressures, the erosion of employer-sponsored insurance-is only part of the much broader political world that health reform operates in. Isolating the financing provisions of comprehensive reform is a useful exercise, but it is artificial. In the real world those provisions would be considered as part of a larger set of reforms. Certainly, the wrong financing strategy can sink health reform (as it did with
Medicare's catastrophic health insurance program in 1989), but strategies that seem controversial or infeasible when judged separately may have a better than expected chance if they are part of a reform plan that has other politically attractive elements.
How health reform is financed is a crucial issue, but if the prevailing political majority and public don't like the health care system proposed by reformers then having a politically sound financing strategy will not be enough.
Despite these cautions, a few tentative conclusions about the politics of financing health reform are possible. First, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. will replace its patchwork, mixed financing system with a single-source public financing system. Most other OECD countries use multiple financing sources and given the strength of the status quo and how high U.S. spending is, it is likely we will retain a mixed system.
Second, in the short to medium-term, politically viable proposals for financing universal coverage probably have to build on employer-sponsored insurance. Employersponsored insurance may rest on the economic illusion that employers pay their workers' health insurance premiums, but the political price for ending that illusion is high. And any health reform that builds away from rather than on employer-sponsored insurance 88 must confront the monumental challenge of replacing an established and rather large financing source.
Third, the difficult politics of paying for universal coverage (and the even more difficult politics of controlling costs) encourages reform-minded politicians to put their faith in savings from increasing prevention, improving quality, moving to electronic medical records, reducing waste, and other reforms whose fiscal impact is at a minimum uncertain, and in reality, is probably often overstated. These faith-based financing strategies might work well on the campaign trail, but they are unlikely to pass muster in a budget process that demands real funding. Moreover, the less you control costs, the more pressure a financing system will feel to keep pace with the rising price-tag for health care.
Finally, the political fortunes of universal coverage depend on redistribution. In the end, someone-employers, taxpayers, the insured, the wealthy-is going to have to pay more (or pay differently) for health reform. Until a politics emerges that imposes those costs on the relevant stakeholders or persuades them to accept the tab, universal coverage is simply not possible.
